Dispute settlement provisions contained in International Investment Agreements have been a headache for manyrndeveloping countries. The main source of the problem emanates from interpretation of some core substantivernand procedural standards contained in such agreements by different arbi tral tribunals in a very inconsistentrnmanner.rnSuch inconsistent interpretations have resulted in locking down host states from making regulatory policyrnreforms that are deemed necessary for the welfare of their citizens. In this context, some countries have startedrnto re-visit their Bilateral Investment Agreements with an aim to re-calibrate or even do away with themrncompletely.rnThe central thesis of this paper is, therefore, that substantive and procedural standard provisions found in BITsrnas interpreted and applied by different ad hoc arbitral tribunals do indeed have tremendous effect on thernregulation of investment domestically and eventually stifle sovereign states from issuing regulatory policyrnreforms and are thus bottlenecks to development. It argues that Ethiopia should re-think its current BIT regimesrnand negotiate better ones; totally quitting from BIT regimes like South Africa is, however, not advisable as itrnwould signal a wrong message.