The Role Of Military Power In Ethiopias National Security (1974-1991)

Among the most intriguing problems confronting students of international relations is the role ofrnmilitary power in the furtherance of a state’s national security. In fact, it is a subject with suchrnwide ramifications that no claim to comprehensive treatment can be easily made. Nonetheless,rnthis study attempts to hold a consistent view of the subject when taking up the Ethiopian case inrnthe 1974-1991 period.rnThe study begins by considering the concept of national security, which basically signifies thernprotection of a state’s vital interests from threats assessed by the regime in power, and that ofrnmilitary power, which is the capability of a state to employ its armed forces effectively inrnsupport of national security goals. The study also discusses and applies the realist approach tornnational security, which holds that national security is basically safeguarding a state’s corerninterests (such as territorial integrity and political independence) from threats emanating fromrnoutside its borders and are primarily political and military in nature. Furthermore, the approachrncalls for a focus on military power considered to be, in peacetime as in wartime, the mostrnessential element of national strength and security.rnThe study then presents the political dynamics of Ethiopia. The country was governed by anrnauthoritarian and Marxist-Leninist leaning regime the policy-making responsibility of which wasrnpractically concentrated in the hands of one individual, namely Mengistu Haile Mariam. Plaguedrnby political frictions and civil wars, the country grappled with numerous military and political threats, which were essentially ingrained in the Horn of Africa region. Against the backdrop of these threats, the post-1974 regime engaged in and maintained a high level of military spending,vigilance and capability. The study emphasizes that the net result was the creation of probablyrnthe largest and best equipped Armed Forces in Sub-Saharan Africa. The study also stresses thatrnthe regime guided the Armed Forces by a doctrine largely based on the Soviet model, centralizedrnthe High Command, conducted constant indoctrination and surveillance, and put its faith in thernaccumulation of weaponry which was mainly provided by the Soviet Union.rnThe study finally notes that the Armed Forces were used in three ways. First and foremost, theyrnwere employed for defense of the country against external aggression, forcing Somalia to desist itsrninvasion of the Ogaden in 1978. Secondly, the Armed Forces were used in a compellent role, asrnapplied to Somalia in 1982 through cross-border air raids and infantry-armored excursions to forcernit to reverse its anti-Ethiopian activities. The third and last use of the Armed Forces was strategicrnintelligence, which was concerned with the gathering and analysis of information on therncapabilities, vulnerabilities and probable courses of action of the states in the Horn of Africa, andrnalso involved carrying out covert operations such as the substantial military aid imparted to friendly insurgent groups operating in Sudan and Somalia

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