Looking in retrospection the modalities adopted under the FDRE Constitution in establishingrnlawmaking authority appears defective in two fundamental aspects. The feature of constrainedrnparliamentOlY systems, which primarily focuses on strong judicial independence to offset thernodds of separation of power i.e. the fusion of executive and legislative organs, does not exist inrn( the constitution. The idea of parliamentary supremacy in constrained system is locked betweenrnthe supremacy of the constitution and the valid enforceable limitations upon lawmaking. Itrnconstrains the exercise of power through strong judiciary with its exclusive checks to defend thernconstitution and eriforce the basic principles which mostly are dubbed as entrenchment,rnjusticiability and supremacy. The other essential defect goes to the manner employed in therndivision of legislative power between the federal and regional governments. In this respect unlikernmost of the constitutions of federations that leave reserve clause upon the states while the federalrngovernment holding only enumerated powers, the FDRE constitution is short of elastic clausernthat generally allows lawmaking authority upon the federal government. Often dubbed asrnimplied power doctrine, such elastic clauses is necessary in federations to constitutionalize inrnorder to render the federal laws legitimate in the event it becomes compulsury 10 exercise arnparticular matter which does not belong in its enumerated jurisdictions. Nevertheless, regardlessrnof the lacuna and without unequivocal constitutional authority the HP R had practically jumpedrnin such areas via several legislations. The empirical examination of certain laws in forcernindicate a number of matters which need constitutional backs are simply left to the federalrngovernment to determine via ordinary laws. Besides, the legislative exercise is not only uneasy tornenact in the form of parliamentary laws but also no extraordinary procedure has been followed.rnThe practice evidently was reinforced the HP R authority can rightly goes beyond the text of thernl constitution to confer additional competencies upon itself with no threat on its constitutionalityrnor the parliament is the maker and breaker of the institutions for which the constitutionrnentrenches. The specific legislations tabled for empirical appraisal have significantly shaped thernexercise of political power both qua constitutions in their scope and in lieu of the constitution inrnterms of the mailers engulfed on the substance of federal powers. In this particular foci thosernlaws regarding the head of states of the republic, systems of federal intervention into the regions,rnintergovernmental relations (IGR), competency of the second chamber, federal power over theautonomy of the city of Addis Ababa, and functional independence of the judicial organ etc canrnremarkably be high lightened as the points of contest. The legislations mentioned with theirrnother kin exclusively stands on Art 55(1) qua constitutional source of authority to markrnlegislative legitimacy on the part of the parliament. Unfortunately if it is not to help as a safernpassage to bond the acts to conform to the constitution, the examined laws tell different contextrnboth in scope and content. Neither the specific authority can be attached with the enumeratedrnjurisdiction of the federal government nor the constitution puts an inference on the possibility tornprovide legal Fameworks in the sense they actual appear now. At times they resemble restrictivernlawmaking tendencies rather than the underlying principle for a more protective approachrnduring enforcement. In fact it is not a surprise the varieties of these legislations would havernwelcomed serious constitutionality tests for if it had been in other jurisdictions who adopt strongrnindependent constitutional adjudicative organ. Otherwise it would have faced ostensiblernrecourses for valid constitutional amendment so long as the laws had brought something new tornthe actual text of the constitution.